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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 11/07/2011 Accident number: 750 
Accident time: 09:15 Accident Date: 10/07/2010 
Where it occurred: Task # 
AF/0101/00096, MF 
0868, Waisal abad 
village, Ward-07,  
Kabul City 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: None 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 11/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
Inadequate detector pinpointing 
use of pick (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-07 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION:  
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Kabul to investigate the demining accident 
involving [the Victim] the de-miner of [Demining group] DT-07. The accident occurred at 09:15 
hours, 10 July 2010 in Task # AF/0101/00096/MF 0868 located in Waisal abad village, Ward-
07 of Kabul City.  
SUMMARY: 
Task # AF/0101/00096/MF 0868 is located in a hillside area contaminated with anti-personnel 
mines planted by Russian forces in 1983. The area is mined several times after the Russian 
withdrawal up to the end of internal conflict in Kabul city. It is recorded by LIS under the 
community No. 096 then confirmed by LIAT in 2008. Around 6 accidents have been occurred 
on locals in mentioned area. 
As per the request of local people, AMAC Central tasked [Demining group] to start clearance 
operation there. DT-07 of [Demining group] started clearance of this task on 01 April 2010. 
Total size of the task is 141618 m2 out of which 58470 m2 has been cleared so far, 16 AP 
PMN2 mines and 1301 different types of ERW found/destroyed by DT-07 up to the accident 
time. 
On 10 July 2010 at 09:15 AM Mr. [the Victim] the de-miner of mentioned team was working in 
his clearance lane, excavating a detected signal, his pick touched on the top of a PMN 2 anti-
personnel mine and caused it to go off. According to the investigation report the de-miner has 
used the pickaxe to investigate the signal instead of the bayonet and it seems as he used the 
pick directly on the top of signal, so caused the accident. Luckily the deminer was fully 
dressed with PPE, so he got a superficial injury on hand. Then the victim de-miner evacuated 
to Ebni Sina hospital for the treatment and further checking up, after one hour he discharged 
from the hospital in normal condition. He is able to continue his activities as a deminer in the 
field. It is worth to be mentioned that the deminer remained safe due to appropriate use of the 
PPE.     
CONCLUSIONS: 
Although the consequence of this accident is acceptable, but the accident could had been 
avoided if the deminer was not further proceeding from 2nd reading marker with pickaxe. 
So carelessness of deminer in terms of using pickaxe in contrary to SOP and lack of control 
by command group are the contributing factors to this accident.  
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
The following points are to be considered: 
• Standard and appropriate tools of prodding and excavation should be used during the 
operations. 
• The command group should strengthen their supervision during operation and stop 
the de-miners from conducting drills in contrary to SOPs. 
• The de-miners should pinpoint the signal properly, mark it and then start excavation 
according to the procedure. 
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• It is the responsibilities of respective IP’s operations department to make sure that a 
proper system of command and control exists in the field. 
Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required to 




Victim number: 941 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron; Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Hand 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. The Victim was discharged from hospital 
in one hour in "normal" condition. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control inadequacy because the Victim 
was working in breach of SOPs and his error was not corrected. The secondary cause is 
listed as Inadequate training because the Victim either did not pinpoint the detector reading 
appropriately or deliberately excavated onto the top of a mine, which implies that he was not 
aware of the risks he was running. Because training and field supervision are management 
responsibilities, both failings imply a significant Management Control Inadequacy. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. National staff have been more responsible than the 
internationals with overall responsibility.  
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